International law exists in the slippery zone between abstract speculation on binding principles and realistic deference to power. 
'Politics of International Law': One Last Time
In two earlier contributions to this journal, I discussed the role that international law plays in the international political world. In the first issue 30 years ago, I examined the old belief that recourse to law would take international actors away from the divisive and dangerous field of 'politics' and into the world of abstract and neutral rules to be applied by impartial courts and expert arbitrators.
1 I tried to show that even as law did offer a specialist vocabulary and a set of institutions that would enable the translation of raw interests into the language of rules, the way those rules then operated remained still dependent on contestable (and often contested) assumptions about the world. This was not to say that international law was useless. On the contrary, its 'indeterminacy' -the way it did not contain substantive resolution within itself -enabled the activities of international actors to be assessed in a professionally competent way by reconciling the demands of practice with the ideals those actors trumpeted to the world at large. If, in the end, all depended on the 'structural bias' within that profession, this did not detract from its authority as long as the bias was understood by dominant actors in that community -in practice, elites -to be respectful of the way they had come to distinguish 'law' from mere 'politics'. Legal competence was the ability to produce that equivalence. In providing it, law made historically specific relations of power seem natural and acceptable.
In the update to that article that I was invited to publish in 2009, my goal was to say a little more about the operation of the linguistic techniques that accounted for the formal 'grammar' of competent law.
2 I also focused on how 'fragmentation' had undermined the centrality of generalist bodies like the International Court of Justice and moved authoritative speech into functional 'regimes' that derived their persuasive power from a combination of technical complexity and commitment to substantive objectives. The 'politics of international law' would now express itself in the clash of specialist vocabularies -trade and environment, security and human rights, human rights and humanitarian law and so on. Political conflict had become a conflict of jurisdictions. This would often take place through 're-description', the professional characterization of an aspect of the world in the language of a functional institution, enabling the institution to assume competence over that aspect. I expressed a worry about how those re-descriptions tended to move the relevant problems from the realm of political contestation. They became part of an increasingly managerialist approach to world problems. But I also suggested that the regimes actually remained quite openended -that they were, in fact, equally indeterminate as law -and, thus, opened strategic possibilities for engagement in the search for a more just world. 3 These texts analysed the operations of law as language. Focus was on argumentative rules. How were contrasting principles 'reconciled', or rights 'balanced' against each other, so as to produce a feeling of closure? What about the rule/exception structure? How did arguments about 'will' turn into points about 'behaviour' and viceversa so as to produce a sympathetic nod from the audience? If this was 'critical', it was so to the extent that it revealed how, despite its formal nature, law still invited those engaged in it to operate with the help of concepts and frameworks that were not neutral in respect of their distributive consequences. This led me to examine how legal institutions developed their 'structural bias', the set of usually unarticulated assumptions about the world that enabled closure in an otherwise open world of argumentative possibility. The result of this two-pronged analysis -a discussion of the formal properties of the legal 'grammar' and a study of its uses within international institutions -was an exposé of the 'politics of international law', a demonstration of how authoritative speech was generated in international legal institutions. The exposé was intended also to suggest ways in which students and practitioners who wanted to make an impact in the world, by attacking or supporting a position, were to go about that task in a professionally competent way.
Since that time, much of my work has become historical. I have wanted to examine the ways in which types of legal speech have become authoritative, have operated to support or critique powerful institutions and have eventually lost to competing vocabularies. If the older work was mostly analytical, the newer studies tried to understand how legal concepts have operated in response to developments in the political world -how, for instance, law once replaced theology as a form of authoritative speech and economics took over from law. 4 Both lines of enquiry focused on (not to say, were obsessed by) international law's relationship to international power. The analytical work asked questions such as 'how does "customary law" operate? ' and 'what are the strengths and weaknesses of argument on "human rights", "humanitarian intervention" or "the definition of aggression"?'. The newer studies examined the life and times of 'discursive formations' with significant legal content such as 'Spanish scholasticism', 'the public law of Europe' or 'ius naturae et gentium' and, of course, 'international law' tout court. 5 What did they mean? How did they emerge? What institutions were they associated with? What understandings of the world did they project? What were their strengths and weaknesses?
There are many ways to write about the history of international law. Older histories were often composed as exercises in providential or 'Whig' history that told the story of international law as increasing institutional maturation and specialization of a 'tradition' going back to the formation of modern statehood and diplomacy, perhaps even into Greco-Roman antiquity. These studies were frequently inspired by a moral commitment to international law as a progressive force. Other histories have preferred to describe international law as an element in the unending struggle for power in a world history where imperial 'epochs' have followed each other in more or less monotonous succession. The tenor of these works has been more detached, even critical. Alongside linear or circular narratives, works with more limited ambition have focused on particular legal institutions such as 'just war' or more technical items such as 'freedom of the high seas', 'diplomatic immunity' or 'investment law'. Many histories have concentrated on individual lawyers or moments; the interwar period being a recent favourite. Many have been written from a post-colonial angle. The idea of 'discursive formation' comes, of course, from M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) . While it is common to separate in Foucault's career distinct 'archaeological' and 'genealogical' phases, I have read it as a much more continuously vacillating set of insights into the formation and operation of types of European knowledge as forms of European power. Like many others, in seeking inspiration, I find myself constantly coming back to all aspects of Foucault's work. These debates have sometimes taken a methodological direction. Attention has been given to questions about 'anachronism' and the context. 7 To what extent is it allowed to read a past text, a lawyer, period or institution by reference to considerations that are important today but were not present (in the same form) at that earlier moment? Is legal meaning imprisoned in context or does it travel in time? And what is 'context' in the first place? While such methodological strictures have their uses, the choices they present are sometimes overly Manichean. All significant history is inspired by contemporary concerns and carried out through the lenses provided by the present. All good history also seeks to understand its object, to the extent it can, by reference to the conditions and concerns valid at the time the object was present. In any case, a history from which we learn nothing is a waste of time (though 'learning' can rarely be captured as unequivocal 'lessons').
In this article, I want to return to the theme of the 'rule of law' by picking up a historical figure -Hugo Grotius -so as to examine the way his principal work generated a novel space for international lawfulness between utilitarian politics and theology. For, according to Grotius, 'no Community … can be preserved without some Sort of Right', and this applied 'certainly [to] the Society of Mankind, or of several nations'. 8 What was at stake? I believe it was the objective of De iure belli ac pacis (1625/1632) to consolidate an authoritative form of legal speech that could sustain firm government at home, help orient subjects towards profitable activities and order human relations in general outside the sphere of domestic laws. Grotius had already tried something like this in the unpublished advocacy brief De Indis (or De iure praedae) that he produced for the Amsterdam Admiralty Court in the context of the Santa Catarina affair in 1604-1606. What laws could be applied in the 'free sea'?
9 But the ambition and the intended audience of the new work were much larger. Even as its immediate reception proved disappointing for its author, it was gradually understood as a fresh and useful source for reflecting about the government of a Europe emerging from a century of confessional warfare. In due course, the work received canonical status. Although it has become customary to point to its technical deficiencies and stylistic eccentricities, its beneficial character has been understood to lie in its successful inauguration of a 'Grotian' tradition situated somewhere between the unscrupulous 'realism' of Thomas Hobbes and the abstract 'idealism' of Immanuel Kant. 10 Such a positive response has not been unexceptional. In the later 17th century, both Protestant and Catholic jurists in Germany were scandalized over the suggestion that natural law could possess legal validity even under the assumption that there was no God. Was Grotius an atheist? 13 In the 18th century, radical thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Gabriel Bonnot de Mably regarded Grotius as a reactionary defender of absolutism. They were especially shocked by his suggestion that individuals and even communities could commit themselves to slavery.
14 Kant famously discarded the intellectual heritage of the whole pre-critical natural law tradition, including Grotius and his followers as 'miserable comforters' whose pretended legal rules -because they were derived from 'facts' (of human nature) -could not have any binding force at all. 15 More recently, critical attention has focused on the colonialist attitudes of Grotius, especially displayed in De iure praedae, and on the rules about occupation of territory and property rights in De iure belli ac pacis. 16 Grotius' reputation as an idol of peace has been challenged by the suggestion that he 'endorsed for a state the most far-reaching set of rights to make war which were available in the contemporary repertoire'. 
Legal Imagination in History
I will suggest here that Grotius' success had to do with the skill with which the Dutch humanist combined his sources to produce a work that, although it relied on a number of old vocabularies and was often confusing or incoherent, produced a new and 13 Although there had been some awareness of DIBP during the Thirty Years' War, larger notice of the work was taken only in the latter half of the century through contacts with Leiden and Dutch intellectual culture. But then it soon overcame its rivals. By 1661, 13 Latin editions were circulating in Germany and the first German commentaries began to be published in the 1660s and 1670s, including annotated student editions and larger analyses, both positive and critical. For a full list of these works, many of which supplemented the original text with large footnoted commentaries, see G. 18 The work not only foregrounded the role of law and lawyers in public life but also projected a 'morality of law' under which the subjects of a legal system -human beings equipped with 'reason', of which Grotius offered a specific understanding -would be called upon to commit to natural and positive laws as well as to the subjective rights underlying them.
Historians of legal and political thought have often queried whether Grotius should be read as the last representative of scholasticism or the originator of distinctly 'modern' natural law. Peter Haggenmacher, for example, sees Grotius' main work as a systematization of the medieval genre of the just war. 19 The Dutch author's views on ius gentium and dominium resemble those of the scholastic theologians. Fernando Vázquez's Controversiae illustris serves him as a constant point of reference on civil government, territorial rights and the laws of war. 20 As a scholar of theology and jurisprudence, Grotius has been claimed to offer 'an abbreviated and simplified version of the central naturalist aspects of Aquinas and Suárez' theory of morality'.
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Some feel he 'seems to be reading Suárez transposed to a different idiom'. 22 On the other hand, Grotius was trained as a Protestant humanist, and his prose was very different from, say, Francisco Suárez's dry and repetitive scholasticism. 23 Grotius experimented with (Ramist) methods and humanist sources and literary tropes, sometimes even claiming his conclusions to follow as mathematical truths from his premises. ' Just as the mathematicians customarily prefix to any concrete demonstration a preliminary statement of certain broad axioms on which all persons are easily agreed, in order that there may be some fixed point from which to trace the proof that follows, so shall we point out certain rules and laws of the most general nature, presenting them as preliminary assumptions which need to be recalled rather than learned for Scholastic writers and Grotius both used the vocabulary of 'reason', but, for Grotius, this did not point to supernatural felicitas but, rather, to the human ability of committing oneself to principles of sociability that could be clearly known. 25 If this resembles Aristotle, unlike the latter, he did not confine sociability to the polis. And if the 'modernity' of Grotius is highlighted by the centrality he gave to individual rights, the 'secularizing' effects of his natural law and his concern to engage with the sceptics, each was already present in medieval theologians and canon lawyers, a fact prompting Brian Tierney to conclude that 'Grotius did not create a new theory of natural rights and natural law; but what he achieved was equally important. He made it possible for the old theory to live in the new world'.
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Deciding on whether Grotius should be read backwards to the middle ages or forwards to 'modernity' is hardly necessary or even useful to the extent that his principal legal works, De iure praedae and De iure belli ac pacis, while doubtless taking up topoi familiar from the past were employed so as to respond to pressing events around him: war, domestic unrest, confessional dispute, expanding trade and colonization. In response, Grotius developed a theory of legal obligation that was independent of (contested) religious assumptions while also avoiding the reduction of law to the search for utility that would always raise the question: 'useful for whom?' The sceptic Carneades had notoriously suggested that '[l]aws … were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest' and that 'that which is called Natural Law [was] mere Chimera'. 27 Grotius responded to this with his theory of rational sociability that would generate its own binding force and offer a vocabulary with which rulers could claim obedience from their subjects irrespective of their religious views or interests. But it would also entitle individuals to demand that their freedoms and properties be left untouched by whatever considerations of abstract justice rulers might be inclined to invoke.
If the latter concerns -in which we may recognize those of sovereignty and property -would in due course emerge as important, perhaps the most important concerns of legal modernity, they were also concerns (and concepts) with a long pedigree. The notion of individual rights and the genealogy of political community that referred back to free subjects contracting and occupying land in a state of nature was already present in the Spanish scholastics and, indeed, in Cicero. 28 But when Grotius then continued that 'liberty in regard to actions is equivalent to ownership in regard to property', the reference to Aristotle could hardly veil the novelty of the understanding of social relations he was now offering: 'old' words -'new' concepts? There is something overly academic in the effort to read a legal text with the view to its systemic coherence. More interesting would be to try to understand what it was that made his the first time, with the purpose of laying a foundation upon which our other conclusions may safely rest.' Grotius, DIP, ch. I, Introductory Remarks, at 17-18. 25 H. Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit (1990) , at 123-125. 26 Tierney, supra note 22, at 342. 27 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s.V, (79 writing seem persuasive in view of the problems that preoccupied his contemporaries. As Grotius well knew, those had especially to do with religion and the economy. My purpose, however, is neither to celebrate the 'Grotian tradition' nor to attack it as an unscrupulous instrument for legitimating capitalism, authoritarianism and colonial rule. Unlike the most influential 20th-century representative of the 'Grotian tradition', I am not impressed by the 'atmosphere of strong conviction, of reforming zeal, of moral fervor' in the oeuvre of the Dutchman. 29 Instead, I am interested in experimenting with a type of legal-historical writing that takes seriously the thesis of law as a 'language' and the task of the lawyer as 'bricolage' -trying to construct a persuasive argument from the bits and pieces of authoritative language lying about in the appropriate professional context. 30 Thinking about Grotius in this way -as an ambitious man seeking to persuade an audience -might not only provide a realistic sketch of the man but might also help in linking what Hans-Georg Gadamer might have called his intellectual 'horizon' to ours.
Grotius in the World
Grotius composed the first and second editions of De iure belli ac pacis as a refugee in Paris in the 1620s and 1630s, where he received a small pension from the king to whom he also dedicated the work. Among the elements that framed his life were his moderate (' Arminian') Protestantism, his past experience as an attorney for the Dutch East India Company and as a high official in the government of the United Provinces, as well as his self-identification as a humanist and a jurist (though he had no formal legal training), hoping to impress the elites of his former home to which he wished to return after years in exile. The time in Paris also coincided with the moment when Jean-Armand du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu, commenced the centralization of the French government. To support this project, and especially his attacks on the nobility, the cardinal had set up a propaganda machine that churned out more or less sophisticated pamphlets and treatises in the genre of raison d'état that celebrated his achievements and supported his policies against his many adversaries. 31 Grotius himself had met the cardinal in the autumn of 1625 as the latter had requested information about the operations of the Dutch East India Company and had even invited Grotius to align himself with the plan of setting up something similar in France. Grotius had politely declined, providing the cardinal only some of the information he had requested, subsequently writing home that he could never agree to the cardinal's view that, 'in matters of state, the weak will always have to yield'. 32 With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the Prolegomena of Grotius' principal work would engage at length with the arguments of the sceptic philosopher Carneades, according to whom natural law was a mere 'chimera' and all human beings were always moved only by their interests. 33 Not so, Grotius would argue. Human beings were, on the contrary, sociable creatures, possessing 'a certain Inclination to live with those of [their] own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of [their] Understanding'. 34 The rest of the book then unfolds as an elaboration of what this 'inclination' would produce in view of the rights and duties in practically any human relationship amenable for legal articulation. Seeking to understand what Grotius was 'doing' as he was writing this work requires coming to terms with his clearly stated wish to distance himself from the 'politics' of the raison d'état while also taking into account his desire to be regarded as useful by the next generation of Dutch political leadership. If there was one aspect of his Dutch background that was the object of Europe-wide envy and emulation, it was the economic successes of the United Provinces. Despite its small size and lack of natural resources, the country had come to exercise a controlling position in the trade between north and south Europe and functioned as a kind of world entrepôt by offering a stable and efficient regime for protecting property and facilitating commercial exchanges. Early on in De iure praedae, Grotius had observed that trust and confidence were key to the country's economic success. Quoting Quintilian on the need of owners to be secure in their possessions, Grotius further stated: 'In this principle of confidence, so to speak, lies the origin of human society, a way of living towards which, by the design of the Creator, man was more strongly impelled than any other living creature.' 35 To the extent that such confidence was not naturally present, it had to be created by law, accompanied by a strong sense of obedience. Law would ground and delimit everybody's rights and legitimize the institutions of government. In this way, law would preside over the marriage of statehood and commerce that had made the United Provinces 'self-sufficient in war-making and state-making, and combined regional consolidation with world-wide expansion of Dutch trade and finance'. 36 Grotius frequently expressed his admiration for the Dutch merchant class, viewing 'the Hollanders' as 'a people surpassed by none in their eagerness for honourable gain'. 37 In comparison to the humble business of private shop keeping, wholesale commerce carried by maritime routes, of which Amsterdam was the world centre, provided an indispensable service to societies and was 'absolutely necessary according 32 In H. Nellen, Hugo Grotius, A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State 1583-1645 (2014), at 329, n. 79. 33 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. V, (79) . 34 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VI, (79) (80) (81) . 35 Grotius, DIP, ch. II, (28). 36 G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth-Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times (2010), at 140. 37 Grotius, DIP, ch. I, (9). to nature's plan'. 38 This mercantile ideology was underpinned by strong faith in providence; freedom of navigation expressed a 'design of Divine justice, that one nation supplies the needs of another, so that in this way (as Pliny observes) whatever has been produced in any region is regarded as a product native to all regions'. 39 Over and over again, Grotius aimed to convince his readers that there was nothing worrying in profit seeking; on the contrary, it contributed to the welfare and interest of the state. 40 Today, Grotius is recognized as the initiator of an influential strand of European jurisprudence. Jurists have found his texts often persuasive, whatever objections or queries they might have had about his style or objectives. No doubt, his situation was not too different from that of any lawyer today, arguing a case, writing a memorandum or producing an academic study. We are expected to connect texts and fragments imaginatively and make use of whatever legal and political vocabularies and tropes that might impress and convince our audiences. In most cases, the choices are really very limited; the routines of legal argument and the expectations of professional audiences do not leave much room for manoeuvring. Yet law changes; old laws come to seem 'inadequate', and new idioms push through to enable saying new things. But the passive form -'law changes' -obscures the fact that it is the lawyer who chooses a new description to an interest or a problem that gives it legal sense. Some moments are more amenable to such re-describing than others. The 1990s may have been such, which surely is what Boutros-Ghali wanted to connote with his reference to the 'Grotian moment'. 41 The religious wars in Europe -which lasted through the lifetime of Grotius -were also such. The authority of the old religious and political vocabularies was breaking at the edges: what attitude should be taken when trading with the infidel or the heretic; how to resolve claims over territory or passage outside domestic jurisdiction; what about taking hostages at war or lying to the enemy; how to deal with a tyrant? Religious moralities and raison d'état provided many different answers to such questions; which should be believed? According to Grotius, it was possible to receive reasonably certain answers to such problems by examining human nature itself; more particularly, the rules and principles that upheld social life. 42 This would be the objective of his proposed science of moral actions, as Annabel Brett has noted, actions that were voluntary rather than natural and that, therefore, could (and ought) to be directed in accordance with 'invariable rules' and principles. 43 One consequence of this was the imprecision of the result. But this was still infinitely better than choosing 38 Grotius, DIP, ch. XII, (356). 39 between contradictory dogmas espoused by warring factions. Grotius' law could be understood and employed even (and perhaps especially) by religious or political adversaries -after all, they 'flow[] from the internal Principles of Man'. 44 It was unnecessary to believe in them; rather, it was sufficient that the protagonists would find them persuasive -perhaps because they would be able to link them to conventional experience, as Grotius suggested.
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A Question from the Present
To deal with a situation of great political complexity and danger, Grotius had recourse to reason and conventional wisdom, compressed into 'rules' and, consequently, a sort of 'legalism' and 'rule of law'. In this sense, international lawyers are his faithful successors. The idea of international government by judges and legal expertise constitutes a hugely important strand of 20th-century jurisprudence. 46 Is that receipt still valid? Part of the present right-wing backlash in the West has to do with objection to being ruled by 'unelected' judges operating within a disembedded system of global economic governance. As the liberal-progressive consensus of the 1990s breaks down and legitimate popular grievance is being hijacked by reactionary nihilists and nostalgia for white male privilege, can the 'rule of law' be invoked as an antidote? If the rule of law relies on a structural bias accepted by the elites (as I suggest above), is not the attack on the elites automatically an attack against that bias as well? If so, then the politics of legalism will appear simply as one politics among others, only having hidden its elitism behind a facade of fake neutrality. How can it then be defended? Why should it be? One of the legacies of the 1990s that inspires the backlash is the ever-growing global inequality. Has the 'rule of law' been complicit in creating and perpetuating it? Surely it has. Is it possible to address global inequality through it? It is hard to say. No doubt, ideas about justice and equality -with all of their question-begging indeterminacybelong to the same family of notions as the rule of law. To strengthen that relationship will surely require addressing the structural bias; international law cannot survive as merely another part of an extremely unjust and violent world. Instead of consolidating its roots more firmly in that world (for example, by expanding investment arbitration), it must find a normative voice that addresses that inequality directly.
As I will now turn to discuss the idea of the 'rule of law' in Grotius, my intention is not to suggest that we should adopt, or even understand, that idea in the way Grotius did (though some of us might do so, at least sometimes). The expression figures nowhere in his writings. I use it anachronistically to invite the reader to sympathize with a lawyer who died more than three-and-a-half centuries ago, but whose employment of what I have called 'legal imagination' is not at all that different from what 44 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. XII, (91). 45 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. XII, (159) . 46 seems required of us as we struggle to come to grips with the puzzling collapse of our inherited intellectual and political certainties. Surely, the authority of the vocabularies of economic globalization, human rights and democratic progress can no longer be taken for granted. Instead of continuing the construction of a just international world from such well-tried materials, we are compelled -perhaps a little like Grotiusto 'bricolage', grasping other texts and utopias so as to try as best we can to persuade new audiences of the authority of what we have to say, provided that there is anything we are able to say.
A Vision of European Social Life, AD 1625
At the time of Grotius' meetings with Cardinal Richelieu, ideological divisions were tearing the European continent apart; Protestant rebellion in Bohemia would soon trigger the Thirty Years' War. Political struggles expanded from the clash of constitutional principles at home -the extent of royal authority and right of resistance, for example -with imperial rivalry in the Americas and in the East Indies. Sustaining European polities in their almost perpetual wars and in their colonial projects 'now depended, to an extent never seen before, on an essential underpinning of economic strength'. 47 Each factor touched Grotius personally, and each had a place in his effort to develop a conception of law that would organize public power and private rights in a system of principles whose validity and binding force would be untouched by the conflicts that pitted Europeans against each other. This would be the 'moral science' of natural law that, as Grotius suggested, would build on nothing more than reason -'a Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some Principles' -as the irreducible core of human nature. 48 For Grotius, those 'Principles' would support a very specific organization of social life: 'But Right Reason, and the Nature of Society … does not prohibit all Manner of Violence, but only that which is repugnant to Society, that is what invades another's Right. For the Design of Society is, that every one should quietly enjoy his own, with the united Force of the whole Community.' 49 Much was included in this quote -the idea of society as a system of rights protection and a bourgeois idyll of community where everyone looks no further than 'quietly enjoy[ing] his own'. Grotius completed this image by occasionally nodding towards a notion of justice that concerned benevolence to one's neighbours. But he insisted on a clear distinction between strict, enforceable law and the 'Counsels and such other Precepts which, however, honest and reasonable they be, lay us under no Obligation [and] 49 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. II, s. I, at 5, (184) . 50 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. IX, (148) (emphasis in original). model of political and economic life from the rebellion against Habsburg rule to the struggle over East Indian markets and to the conflicts over settlement in the Americas. It would explain the economic and political success of a country whose virtues he had celebrated in his early years but that would eventually leave him sidelined and bitter as he watched those successes accumulate from imposed exile.
This image of social life was very much in harmony with Grotius' moderate Protestantism, exposed in his theological writings where he concentrated on Christianity's shared truths and ethical precepts. Grotius himself believed that his most important activities had to do with advancing Christian unity, an effort reflected in his legal writings as well. 51 Long after his death, he was more famous as the composer of De veritate religionis christianae (1640) than for De iure belli ac pacis. 52 He hated the dogmas about predestination and free will that had divided even Protestants against each other. He believed that state power needed a religious foundation that would not be dependent on contested dogmas but would still engage the world of internal obligation. 53 Faith was particularly important, he wrote, to uphold obedience 'in the universal Society of Mankind', where the laws were few and 'derive their Force chiefly from the Fear of a Deity'. 54 Grotius was keen to provide conclusive proof of the rightness of the Christian religion. The same desire operated in his effort to develop natural law into an incontrovertible technique for discovering universal rules applying across religious divisions. As he wrote in the famous passage in the Prolegomena to De iure belli ac pacis, he wanted to refer the Proofs of those Things that belong to the Law of Nature to some such certain Notions, as none can deny, without doing Violence to his Judgment. For the Principles of that Law, if you rightly consider, are manifest and self-evident, almost after the same Manner as those Things are that we perceive with our outward Senses, which do not deceive us, if the Organs are rightly disposed, and if other Things necessary are not wanting. 55 This quotation resembled the attack on 'dogma' in the theological works and led directly to the famous response to the sceptic view of 'Right' as 'nothing but an empty Name' that was 'instituted by Men for the Sake of Interest'. 56 Feeling the power of this attack, Grotius responded with a view of natural human sociability that nobody in their right mind -that is to say, nobody with 'reason' -could deny. 57 accordance with utility or self-interest. As nature pushed humans to society, it also compelled them to respect the rules that made social life between predominantly (though not wholly) self-regarding individuals possible. 58 It was precisely the ability to live by rules that distinguished human beings as creatures of 'reason':
But it must be owned that a Man grown up, being capable of acting in the same Manner with respect to Things that are alike, has, besides an exquisite Desire of Society, for the Satisfaction of which he alone of all Animals has received from nature a peculiar Instrument, viz. the Use of Speech; I say, that he has besides that, a Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some general Principles; so that what relates to this Faculty is not common to all Animals, but peculiarly agrees to Mankind.
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Here was the core of the Grotian 'rule of law', the effort to uphold a sense of obligation that would compel humans to act in ways that would go against their immediate self-interest. It was true, Grotius wrote, that obedience was often useful and that violation 'saps the Foundation of [one's] own perpetual Interest'. But law 'has not Interest merely for its End'. We have an 'impulse' to obey that 'brings Peace to the Conscience while Injustice, Racks and Torments'. We seek happiness but learn that '[t]hat is happy indeed which has Justice for its Boundaries'. 60 Grotius rejected the blunt empiricism of jurists such as Alberico Gentili, who, he argued, had failed to enquire into the 'rules of Equity and Justice' behind his 'few Examples'' as well as Jean Bodin's 'political' outlook. The point was to proceed from mere control of external behaviour to the 'very Foundation upon which we build our Decisions'. 61 What this would mean is illustrated by the distinction Grotius made between 'internal' obligations that consisted of what was 'really lawful in itself ' and things that were 'only lawful externally'. 62 Even if it was true that only the latter were subject to public enforcement, law as 'moral science' included both, which is why, for example, after having given an account of the very permissive rules of warfare under the law of nations in Book III of De iure belli ac pacis, he wrote long sections on 'moderation' ('temperantia') that seemed to deprive the belligerent parties of 'almost all the Rights, which [he] may seem to have granted them'. 63 The relationship between the two orders -external and internal -has puzzled commentators. It is, however, an absolutely central aspect of Grotius' view of law as 'moral science' that dealt with 'Principles' entrusted both with a sense of obligation and public enforceability. 58 The 'reason' in Grotius, Brett has written, is not so much a 'tamer of passions' as a 'recognizer of likeness, or alterity'. Brett, 'Natural Right and Civil Community', supra note 48, at 42. 59 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VII, (84) (85) . 60 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. XIX, XXI, XXV, (95, 96, 100). 61 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. XL, (110). 62 Grotius, DIBP, bk II, ch. X, s. I, at 3, (1414). In his Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence, Grotius stated quite clearly the basic principle behind the operation of 'law' (in contrast to coercion or the prudential pursuit of interests): a law has 'an obligation affecting even the mind; for obedience must be given not only through fear, but for conscience sake, and this is a consequence of all laws'. 64 He then explained this by noting that 'all beings seek their common benefit, and further what is peculiarly their own, and especially self-preservation; as beasts, by the union of male and female, seek the propagation of their species and the rearing of their young offspring'. But a human being, 'while thus acting, as conscious in his mind that he does what is right; but, in so much as he is a being endowed with reason, he is inclined to be further guided by religion, and the rules of social intercourse with mankind, the foundation of which is to do unto others as we would they should do unto us'. 65 If natural law was authoritative (as it was, of course), this was because nature had been created by God. 66 An argument based on divine will helped lift nature's pronouncements from the realm of physical 'inclinations' to facts of a normative character, binding on humans generally. Despite the great scholastic controversy about divine voluntarism and rationalism that preoccupied theologians and of which Grotius was well aware, he never gave up this point -even as (like in many other matters) he refrained from taking a clear position and sought to write in such a way that neither committed voluntarists nor rationalists would object. 67 With some exasperation, he wrote in De iure belli ac pacis that the acts that reason dictates as obligatory or unlawful 'must consequently be understood to be either commanded or forbid by God himself '. 68 They must be so understood because otherwise it would be inexplicable why they would be other than mere counsel of prudence. But, in regard to the content of that law -the point at which Carneades' sceptical arguments were at their most powerful -the theological frame could be set aside. All that was needed was to examine the features of the social world and the ways in which 'many men of different Times and Places' had in fact behaved. 69 Both a priori and a posteriori methods were available, and their results were binding because they emanated from God. But this was not the God of the Calvinists, not a god of predestination and theocracy, but, rather, one who only decreed the general frame within which human society had to be formed and who had bound Himself to his creation. Within that frame, humans were entrusted with subjective rights and the liberty that would enable them to choose the moral life of good Christians.
Natural Law as Frame
Grotius objected to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and defended the freedom of the will, but he regarded that issue as something on which Christians could reasonably disagree. 70 Similarly, in his legal works, he constructed natural law so as to allow human beings to enjoy the rights of personal freedom and property and to construct political communities in accordance with their will. In those 'self-made' communities, they could live securely under domestic civil laws that would push them towards conforming behaviour, virtue and happiness. From the safety of their societies and with emboldened consciences, these industrious people could undertake voyages to distant lands to conduct profitable trade with the infidel. 71 They could purchase and deliver slaves across the oceans 72 and work on and occupy 'any waste or barren Land' because 'whatever remains uncultivated is not esteemed a Property'. 73 Grotius gave an early formulation of this view as he sat down in his office in The Hague to produce the long advocacy tract De iure praedae in 1604. The principal elements of De iure belli ac pacis remained as he set them down -the view of natural law within which (subjective) rights of liberty and property combine with a system of reacting to violations and punishing the guilty. 74 Both works were written under the shadow of war and translated a set of Roman remedies into four just causes of war: self-defence, the defence of property, the collection of debts and the punishment of injury.
75 Natural law became a 'frame' within which individuals may use their liberty and enjoy their properties in the secure knowledge that any violation will trigger a punishment either by themselves or by a public authority. 76 70 See, e.g., Trapman, 'Grotius and Erasmus', in Nellen, supra note 32, at 81-84. 71 For the (then unorthodox) point about contracting with the infidel being just, see Grotius, DIP, ch. XIII,
. 72 This, it appears, applies only to prisoners of war made slaves under the law of nations (the usual justification for enslaving Africans captured in slavery raids). In that case, the owner 'has the Power to transfer his Right to another, in the same manner as the Property of Goods'. Grotius, DIBP, bk III, ch. VII, s. V, at 2, (1364). In these and other paragraphs, Grotius uses the term 'servitus', which covers many different types of personal subordination. 74 This is also the conclusion of the extensive comparison of the two works in Haggenmacher, supra note 62, especially at 615-627. 75 Grotius, DIP, ch. VII, (102-104) ; DIBP, bk II, ch. I, s. II, at 2, (393-395). The continuity between the essential jurisprudential content in the two works is the core message in Haggenmacher, supra note 62, especially at 176-180, 549-552. 76 The permissive character of Grotius' natural law is usefully discussed in B. Tierney, Liberty and Law: The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100-1800 (2014), at 218-247.
In the early work, Grotius stressed that God had designed the principles of the natural order, including the 'first' among these, 'self-interest'. From this, it followed for Grotius that 'expediency might perhaps be called the mother of justice and equity'. 77 The determination of the just causes in terms of subjective rights (of person, property, obligation and punishment) followed from the deliberate choice by Grotius of 'the standpoint of a particular individual': 'What each individual has indicated to be his will, that is law with respect to him.' 78 This grounded the binding force of contracts and laid the foundation for the confidence and good faith that were needed to secure the operation of a transnational system of commercial exchanges. 79 Respect of property and the efficient enforcement of contracts also allowed the sovereign to 'sleep' while the subjects were busily engaged in commercial dealings. 80 Through contracting, individuals would choose the nature of their relations -law was premised on that freedom of choice 81 -while their private transactions would benefit the state as well. Even civil community would result from a contract to protect rights, while the binding force of that contract was based on 'the rule of good faith' (fidei regula). 82 Twenty years later, Grotius had left the voluntarism of his early work. The question treated in De iure belli ac pacis had to do again with the permissibility of something that Christians were eagerly practising -war -but expediency now gave way to sociability ('appetitus societatis'). He was particularly desirous to give a good response to those who, like Carneades, believed that any idea of law among nations was something 'instituted by Men for the sake of Interest [only]'. 83 For this purpose, he gave 'sociability' a distinctly legal meaning. 84 It may be true, Grotius admitted, that what is closest to us is our self-love and the inclination of self-preservation. But that was in no way contrary to the existence of a system of law and order; on the contrary, it was the best guarantee of it. Grotius began by using the famous argument that 'the Mother of Natural Law is human Nature itself '. 85 And a part of human nature was 'a desire for Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own kind, not in any way whatever, but peaceably and in a community regulated according to the best of his Understanding'. 86 In the 1631 edition, Grotius would expressly associate this inclination with the Stoic notion of oikeiosis, as mediated through Cicero. 87 This was neither designed to further Aristotelian happiness (eudaimonia) nor the orthodox Stoic notion of moral goodness. Instead, it was to account for the idea of being bound by rules in a community with others. 88 To explain this, Grotius took up Cicero's distinction between sociability according to the 'first impressions of nature' that collapsed into the right of self-defence and sociability associated with 'the Knowledge of the Conformity of Things with Reason which is a Faculty more excellent than the Body'. 89 The former expressed itself in the same way as 'every Animal seeks its own Preservation', while the latter -a higher-level orientation -was valid for humans in society with others whose preferences were alien and opaque but who nevertheless shared parallel instincts. It expressed the character of human beings as beings of reason, able to follow rules; it ought therefore to 'be dearer to us than natural Instinct'. 90 Unlike animals, humans operated under rules, or, as Grotius put it, they were 'capable of acting in the same way in respect of Things that are alike'. 91 This bound human beings to directives of action they should follow even when, at least in the short term, doing so might go against their immediate interests. Above all, it called upon them to ' 89 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. II, s. I, at 1-2, (180) (181) . 90 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. II, s. I, at 2, (181) . Already in Grotius, IHR, ch. VI, (5), he distinguished between human beings as beings of reason, by referring to the capacity to obey 'rules of social intercourse' consisting above all of a sense of reciprocity ('do unto others as we would they should do unto us'). 91 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VII, (84) . 92 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VIII, (85-86). 93 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. IX, (87).
to a reasonable Nature'. 94 Here was the legal proprium -the obligation that was based neither on interest nor on revelation. It provided Grotius' response to Carneades as well as to 'politici' such as Bodin's content to explain 'what it may be profitable or advantageous for us to do'. 95 And it distinguished him from the Aristotelian view of virtue as a mean: if justice was about respect of the rights of others, there was nothing 'mediate' about it. Temperance or fortitude may affect the way we interpret rules, but they do not affect the call for obedience: you either obey or you do not. 96 Of course, Grotius believed that God had created human nature and the rules of reason and had told us to abide by them. In other ways, however, theology played no role in discerning the contents of natural law. That had become a purely human affair. 97 The character of natural law ('ius naturae') as a 'frame' within which human society would develop was further specified by Grotius' three-part definition of 'ius' that he took over practically unchanged from Suárez. The first meaning was the old 'objective' one: 'that which is just.' But Grotius defined this in an astonishingly negative, almost question-begging, way as 'that which may be done without Injustice', supplying the explanation that 'unjust is that which is repugnant to the society of reasonable Creatures'. 98 Despite the superficial resemblance this carried to the Thomistic notion of justice as the object to which all (just) action strives, in practice, it was subordinated to the subsequent two meanings of ius as a subjective right and a lawful command. It simply told its addressee that I am all right as long as I do not violate anybody's right or break the law. 99 This suited very well an ideal of social relations where the position of individuals, their rights and their liberties was central. The famous passage in the Preliminary Discourse that described sociability as 'the Fountain of Right, properly 94 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. X, (150-151). 95 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. LVIII, (131) . 96 ), at 383-437 (arguing that Grotius' 'revolutionary effort to secularise natural law' was particularly clear in the 'conspicuous and consistent idiosyncrasy of Grotius' biblical interpretation') (at 435). 98 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. III, at 1, (136) . 99 See further Haggenmacher, supra note 62, at 462-463. The strikingly permissive character of Grotius' natural law, especially as it unfolded in DIP, has been often noticed. It is true that in the later work he did sometimes confine natural law to provisions that were either mandatory or prohibited something so that things 'that [were] merely permitted by the Law of Nature [were] properly without the Bounds of the Law of Nature'. Grotius, DIBP, bk I. ch. II, s. V, (190) . Here what was permitted appeared to fall outside the law altogether. Yet much of the law of nations that had to do with belligerent action was formulated as specific permissions of types of behaviour of which Grotius was critical. 100 Clearly, this was a society whose members, above all, were desirous to secure their possessions and to punish those who intervene in them. The absence of reference to the common good or public utility is striking. The standpoint remains as it was in De iure praedae -namely, that of the individual, called upon to act 'justly' not in pursuit of some moral telos but, rather, to protect his or her suum. The normative substance of society emerged gradually from the operations of a horizontal network of subjective rights and liberties.
A World of Rights
But the strongest formulation of the 'primacy of the right over the good' emerged from the way in which Grotius concentrated on the (second) meaning that he ascribed to the expression of 'ius' as 'a Moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly'. 101 This resembled greatly the 'right' put forward by scholastic theologians, but, unlike the latter, Grotius suggested that the substance of 'strict' justice, the justice that was enforceable by public authorities, was filled by such rights.
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These rights had emerged from relations of commutative justice, and their counterpart was the duty to abstain from what belonged to others, restore any property unjustly taken and keep promises.
103 Although Grotius did suggest that governments were also to exercise distributive justice by giving some attention to the merits or need of subjects, this was a secondary concern that was not to disturb the enjoyment of rights 'properly speaking' -namely, those that 'consist [ed] 
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The comprehensive nature of De iure belli ac pacis -the way it extended from a commentary on a just war into a discussion of property, contract, sovereign power and punishment (Book II of Grotius' main work) -had to do with the way Grotius made lawful punishment, and, hence, the justice of war, dependent on the violation of rights ('strictly speaking'). If a just cause was constituted of a violation of a subjective right, then a full treatment of the matter had to contain a full discussion of the number and 100 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VIII, (86). 101 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. IV, (138) (emphasis in original). The primacy of (subjective) rights in Grotius' system was next highlighted in his Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence where Grotius defined 'law' in its 'particular' sense as either a right of merit that followed by distribute justice or a right of property based on commutative justice. Grotius, IHR, chs V-X, (1-2); see also Tuck, supra note 83, at 66-68. 102 Or as Knut Haakonssen puts it, 'Ius naturale in the strict sense is, then, every action which does not iniure any other person's suum, which in effect means that it is every suum which does not conflict with the sua of others'. K. Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (1996), at 27. 103 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VIII, (86). 104 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. X, (88-89).
nature of the rights we have, how those rights were acquired and lost, how they were transacted and enforced in daily business and how, precisely, reactions to rights violations were to be conducted. These latter tasks raised, over again, the question about the relationship between property and sovereignty.
Grotius came to that question by differentiating between two types of subjective right, those he called 'Faculty' (facultas) and those he termed ' Aptitude' (aptitudo). The term facultas covered '[r]ight properly, and strictly taken'. 105 It was strict law and enforceable by public authorities. Grotius explained that in making the connection between facultas and subjective right he followed Roman law by including under that term the power that one had over oneself (that is to say, one's personal liberty) and those under one's tutelage (wife, children or slaves) as well as the dominium that one had over one's property, together with the claims one had to those who owed something to oneself. 106 Every human being possessed such facultas by virtue of merely being human. The network of relations between such facultates (or their holders) was covered by what Grotius termed expletive justice ('commutative justice' in Aristotelian language), the horizontal system of inter-individual relations characterized by the exercise of such subjective rights, on the one hand, and the duty to respect them, on the other hand. 
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A facultas was contrasted by mere 'aptitudo' that Grotius received from the Aristotelian notion of distributive justice (re-labelled 'allocative justice') governing the vertical relations between public power and the subject. 109 Or, in Grotius' own words, '[a]ttributive Justice, styled by Aristotle … Distributive, respects Aptitude or imperfect Right, the attendant of those Virtues that are beneficial to others, as Liberality, Mercy, and prudent Administration of Government'.
110 While 'facultates' were 'perfect' rights that may be exercised against everyone and implemented, if necessary, by just war, 'aptitudes' consisted of rights 'of larger Extent' that had to do with the human capacity 'to discern Things pleasant or hurtful' and to which belonged things such as: 'prudent Management in the gratuitous distribution of Things that properly belong to each particular Person or Society, so as to prefer sometimes one of greater before of 105 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. V, (138) . 106 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, (138) (139) . 107 Grotius made the distinction between two kinds of rights and the corresponding forms of (distributive and commutative) justice already in Grotius, IHR, chs X-XIII, (2-3). Even as he later moved away from the Aristotelian vocabulary, already here he ended in the conclusion that associated the law of nature wholly with the maintenance of subjective rights. Tuck, supra note 83, at 66-67; Schneewind, supra note 96, at 79-81. 108 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. VIII, (86). 109 For a discussion of the Grotian terminology here, see E. Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l'émergence doctrinale du droit international classique (1998), at 167-171. 110 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. I, s. VIII, (143). lesser merit, a relation before a Stranger, a poor Man before one that is rich.'
111 While the rights of life and property as well as their derivatives -rights based on commutative relationships between individuals -were binding as strict law, entitlements based on allocative (distributive) justice, based on merit, charity, liberality and other such virtues, remained legally unenforceable. But, although they did not have any strong claim on the state and were not enforceable against a facultas, they were part of 'law' as moral science that had the objective of pushing subjects to virtue. 112 This famous concept of subjective rights departed from the scholastic view of law as an instrument of universal justice where every thing and person would possess its determined place.
113 From now on, 'strict law' would operate through the disposal by private individuals of their subjective rights in accordance with their inclinations; it would be for the state to see that they did this by respecting each other's coterminous rights.
114 By contrast, the imperfect social rights would remain confined in the court of conscience so that 'if a Man owes another any Thing, not in strictness of Justice but by some other Virtue, suppose Liberality, Gratitude, Compassion, or Charity, he cannot be sued in any Court of Judicature, neither can War be made upon him on that Account'. 115 No humanitarian intervention was allowable on Grotian premises. De iure belli ac pacis projected a system of just war by conceptualizing the international society (or, indeed, any society) in terms of the horizontal system of subjective rights to which corresponded a duty on everyone not to cause 'injury' to them. 116 It was then to the elucidation of what rights we have that the largest part of Book II of De iure belli ac pacis was devoted. That his work has been seen as a general treatise on natural law follows from the extraordinary exhaustiveness whereby Grotius undertook this task.
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Law as a 'Moral Science' of Government
It is true that, as moral science, law for Grotius also 'comprehends the Acts of [ also oblige us'. 118 Although such virtues were not the effect of contractual arrangements and could therefore not be enforced by public authorities, they still served to direct the ways of public government. When punishing offenders, for example, magistrates were to take into account 'the Nature and Circumstances of Fact' -a task that 'doth often require great Diligence, and the proportioning of Punishment' as well as 'much Prudence and Equity'. For this reason, 'in all well regulated Societies', those that were 'judged to be the best and most prudent' were to be appointed magistrates. 119 All ruling was to take place through prudence and equity, for as Grotius acknowledged with express reference to Aristotle, 'we cannot expect the same Degrees of evidence in Moral, as in Mathematical Sciences'. 120 The criteria of prudence and equity, among other aspects of good government, were thus also included by Grotius in the third meaning of 'ius' as the same as 'law' ('Lex'), which was further divided into 'natural' and 'voluntary' law, the former comprising a wide category of judgments by 'Right Reason, shewing the Moral Deformity of Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature'. 121 Something might be morally necessary even if it did not give rise to enforceable rights.
The project that Grotius set himself to accomplish was to turn law into a science of moral actions -actions, Annabel Brett has observed, that were voluntary rather than natural and that therefore could (and ought) to be directed in accordance with 'invariable rules' and principles. 122 One consequence of this was the imprecision of the result. Moral reasoning (a sub-class of which was legal reasoning) produced only more or less persuasive arguments, the famous a priori and a posteriori points that Grotius discussed in the Preliminary Discourse and which called for contextual balancing. As he wrote, '[i]n Things of a Moral nature … those Means which conduce to certain Ends do assume the very Nature of that End'. 123 If we have the 'moral quality' of a right, we are authorized by natural law to do what is necessary for its realization, sometimes even against those who are innocent. But it is also the case that the 'law of Charity' might call upon us to mitigate such effect. 124 Here, it appears, two rights (mine and that of the innocent person) clash so that prudential adjustment is needed.
In other words, different kinds of 'moral quality' entailed different kinds of duties, whose relationship to each other was not always obvious, as illustrated by the famous contrast between just war, which was regulated by natural law, and solemn public war ('bellum solenne'), which was addressed under the voluntary law of nations. 125 The latter often permitted action that was prohibited by the former. How was this possible? Was not natural law 'so unalterable, that God himself cannot change it'? 126 Well, to explain this, Grotius had recourse to the scholastic device of making a distinction -a division of the law of nations into two sub-types: 'that which is truly and in every respect lawful, and that which only provides certain external Effect after the Manner of [Civil Law].' 127 The former only implemented the precepts of the law of nature and shared its binding character on consciences. The latter deviated from the law of nature for reasons of prudence or pragmatism. It included provisions such as, for example, enforcement against private traders for the recovery of public debt when the danger of final loss otherwise became too great. 128 Likewise, the law of nations allowed third parties to refrain from judging the war's justness, owing to the 'danger[]' that they might otherwise be 'quickly involved' in the conflict themselves. 129 But solemn public war was not entirely dissociated from the requirements of justice and equity. Although it had been 'established by Nations' that both sides were entitled to kill their enemies and destroy and appropriate enemy property, all such powers were supplemented by the famous 'temperamenta' -calls for moderation, extensively detailed in Chapters X-XVI of De iure belli ac pacis. A belligerent may indeed enjoy impunity for killing the enemy, but such an act is never 'entirely innocent'; whether this was the right thing to do 'internally' was to be measured by reference to a moral evaluation of the objectives of the action. 130 The distinction between internal and external duties did not -as it may seem -signify the separation of ('mere') morality and law. Both were regimes of law as a system of moral action -in the one case, the action was 'lawful in itself '; in the other, it was 'only lawful externally'. 131 The distinction embodied Grotius' realistic acknowledgement of the legality of certain practices of warfare that had been accepted by European sovereigns, whatever their status under ideal theory. He rejected the pacifism of Erasmus as firmly as he had rejected the scepticism of Carneades. 132 But the distinction allowed him to take a critical standpoint towards the warring parties even when they acted under the law of nations and to recommend actions 'which our Reason declares to be honest, or comparatively good tho' [sic] they are not enjoined us'. 133 The representatives of jurisprudence were to instruct rulers and subjects not only about their formal rights but also about virtuous behaviour, good mores and a sense of equity and appropriateness, items 'which [are] the foundation of social life'. 134 A Dutch patriot needed also to be a staunch moralist! No doubt, Grotius saw himself providing a realistic view of how a political community could thrive in a world of expanding commerce, colonization and continuous war. 135 Legal obligation would bind subjects in their conscience, but this was not a problem because that obligation was intended to affirm their natural rights. Enforcement of the law was delegated to a strong public authority the nature of which changed somewhat on the way from De iure praedae to De iure belli ac pacis. The pragmatic interest in the former to authorize the violence exercised by the Dutch East India Company in the colonies was replaced in the later work by the effort to limit religious resistance to public power at home and to deal with '[l]icentiousness in regard to War, which even barbarous Nations ought to be ashamed of '. 136 Stress in De iure praedae had been on how private actors were entitled to punish rights violators, while, in the later work, public authorities would be allocated primary responsibility for ensuring that everyone could enjoy their rights peacefully. The fact that no stable theory of statehood emerged from these works resulted from the Janus-faced character of the result; depending on one's standpoint, one could see either a system of natural rights or a hierarchical system of public authority. In De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius achieved the final formulation of his 'contractual theory of absolute sovereignty'. 139 Instead of beginning from God's will, as he had done in his early work, he now began with the nature of human sociability. 140 No distinction emerged between the rise of property rights and public authority. Because the point of the exercise was the protection of liberty and property, the end result was a '[c]ommunity of Rights and Sovereignty'. 141 Private and public authority further intermingled in two ways. First, the motive for the establishment of public power lay in the effort to maintain social peace with which Grotius understood a situation where 'every one should quietly enjoy his own, with the Help and with the united Force of the Community'. 142 This was a restatement of Grotius' legalism; everyone's attachment to their liberty and property will inspire them to understand that this requires the reciprocal honouring of everybody else's freedom and property as well. Second, the process whereby the 'pact' was concluded -by '[r]ight of Prior Occupancy', on the one hand, or an act of 'subjection' by consent, on the other -differed normally in no way from the ways in which private property was gained: 'Jurisdiction and Property are usually acquired by one and the same Act,'
143 the juridical nature of the process was illustrated by the way it joined both corpus and animus: 'Where there is no Will, there is no Property.' 144 Grotius remained vague about whether the act of seizure or the 'pact' was the real origin of sovereign authority -this did not really matter because both were simply evidence of the presence of right-creating will. Everything was transferred, but how the powers then would be distributed between the different 'magistrates' differed on a case-by-case basis:
For those who had incorporated themselves into any Society, or subjected themselves to any one Man, or Number of Men, had either expressly, or from the Nature of the Thing must be understood to have tacitly promised, that they would submit to whatever either the greater part of the Society, or those on whom the Sovereign Power had been conferred, had ordained.
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The extent of political sovereignty was then not derived from the pact but, rather, from the nature of political community as the 'most perfect of all societies'. 146 The constitutional form or the distribution of the 'marks of sovereignty' may vary, even greatly. Some sovereigns possessed patrimonial rights; others did not. Many were bound by promises or alliances (and even unequal treaties) with other states. But 'sovereignty' itself was invariable, connoting supreme power 'whose acts are not subject to another's Power, so that they cannot be made void by any other human Will'. 147 In the same way, the state remained juridically the same even when its constitutional form changed. The choice between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy was something for politics or the political scientist ('politicus') to deliberate. By contrast, the presence of statehood and the identity of a 'civitas' was a legal matter, unaffected by such transformations. 148 Finally, though sovereignty and property arose from the same acts, they were not to be confused. What was acquired as 'sovereignty' was 'jurisdiction' 142 Grotius, DIBP, bk I, ch. II, at 5, (184) . 143 Grotius, DIBP, bk II, ch. III, s. IV, at 2, (457) (emphasis in original). 144 Grotius, DIBP, bk II, ch. IX, s. I, (664). 145 Grotius, DIBP, Preliminary Discourse, s. XVI, (93). 146 Grotius, DIBP, bk II, ch. V, s. XXIII, (552). 147 either in a territorial or a personal sense. This would be in the hands of the constitutional ruler(s) who were bound to maintain and secure it. This contrasted with 'property', which could also be transferred to foreigners without affecting the powers of jurisdiction.
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Although governmental power (as 'sovereignty'/jurisdiction) was received from the 'people' and could be divided (even with a foreign power), there was no sense in which it would ever be held by the 'people'. Grotius distinguished between sovereignty's 'common' and 'proper' subject somewhat like he had earlier distinguished between the respublica and the magistrates. The former was the source of law and the constitution. By concluding the 'pact', the people constituted themselves as a body of citizens -both a civitas and a populus -and decided on how the marks of sovereignty were to be distributed. But they did not rule. Instead, it was the 'proper' sovereign -the prince and other holders of marks of sovereignty -who had the exclusive power to govern the state.
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The political community in Grotius' mature work was utterly committed to advancing 'the peaceful Enjoyment [by subjects] of their own Rights'. 151 It was not just some group of robbers or pirates. This was so even if the people or the ruler acted tyrannically. It would still be that manifestation of a legally articulated reason under which the subjects recognize each other as right-bearers committed to solving their disputes by a centralized system of enforcement. The law was absolutely central: ' And a State ('civitas'), however distempered, is still a State, as long as it has Laws and Judgments, and other Means necessary for Natives, and Strangers, to preserve or recover their just Rights … [t]he Law (especially that of Nations) is in a State, as the Soul in a human Body, for that being taken away, it ceases to be a State.' 152 The law was what accounted for the continued identity of a state, whether seen as a populus, a civitas or a respublica. This was so because the 'peace' that was the objective of the state was not just any kind of system of government (of terror, for example). It was the ability of the subjects to enjoy their rights without disturbance and to bring violations to be adjudicated by public authorities. The very point of government and the basic limit to a ruler's authority lay in the peaceful operation of civil society, the systems of property and commercial exchange. When Grotius wrote that the law of nations was the 'soul' of a state, he meant the basic structure of individual rights and the duty of the magistrate to enforce them. The substance of the laws or even of the character of the constitution was a secondary, 'political' matter. 153 The important thing lay in the foundation of a state on a 'pact' and the possession by individual right holders of a 'common sovereignty' that, even as it normally lay dormant, nevertheless provided the natural and conceptual condition for a just government.
The rule of law was visible everywhere. Because the people had bound the ruler(s) to act in accordance with constitutional principles, actions contrary to them would be void. 154 If rulers acted outside their public function -for example, when engaged in commercial 'buying and selling' -they were bound by the law just like their subjects. 155 Immunity for acts carried out in public capacity followed from the fact that they were 'looked on as done by the whole Nation'. 156 What it meant to say that the law was 'in a state like the soul in a human body' was that it created that unity without which the pact-making individuals would remain alien to each other and their needs and interests in constant opposition. The unity of the state could not reside in a religious duty, and obedience was compulsory, famously 'though we should even grant … that there is no God'. 157 Grotius sometimes referred to the common utility of the subjects as the principle that united the state but gave it no independence from the aggregation of the special utilities of the subjects. Something more was needed, and, in the section that dealt with the extinction of states (and property), Grotius explained what that something was. Although states (now variably associated with the 'people') consisted of 'separate and distant Members', he wrote, they were nevertheless 'united in Name' as having a 'Constitution' or a 'Spirit' ('spiritus'). It was 'this Spirit and Constitution in the People' that made states cohere in 'a full and compleat Association for a political Life ('vitae civilis consociatio plena atque perfecta')' and provided them with 'the sovereign Power, the Bond that holds the State together ('per quod respublica cohaeret')'. 158 'Spirit' -'constitution' -'sovereign power'; the political community received in Grotius' mature work formed an ephemeral unity that, although based on the 'pact', ultimately separated itself from the interests of the pact makers, ascending to a higher spiritual level. 159 There, the constitution and the law became the 'soul' of the state; there, subjects would not only be externally, but also internally, subordinated to the laws. A spiritual entity was created, though not one whose servants would be found in the traditional church. The duty of obedience was to that entity, represented by 'sovereign Power' that governed through legislative action under the constitution. The spiritual unity of the state called the subjects for obedience to the acts of the 'proper sovereign'. Because the entity they had created existed as a spirit, they were bound not only externally but also, above all, in the forum of their conscience. 160 
Rule of Law and Economic Individualism
As Benjamin Straumann has noted, Grotius is a representative of the tradition of 'economic individualism' that leads from Marcus Cicero to John Locke (and onwards) and receives the justice of a system of distribution not from its result but, rather, from the process whereby it was established. 161 Grotius himself was very clear of this orientation; as he put it in his early work, '[u] nder the law of nations … all men should be privileged to trade freely with one another'. He meant thereby the 'primary law of nations' that allowed the natural law character of 'the principle of exchange' to be derived from the way nature had organized human societies so that trade had become a necessity among and between them. 162 Grotius could not be too enthusiastic about free trade and navigation; they brought people together from all over the world, enabling the distribution of goods everywhere. They belonged to the 'sacrosanct law of hospitality', according to which 'anyone who abolishes this system of exchange, abolishes also the highly prized fellowship in which humanity is united. He destroys the opportunities for mutual benefactions. In short, he does violence to nature herself '. 163 To avoid conditioning this busy world of exchange by objectives or moralities from the outside, Grotius claimed to have found in humans a natural sociability that prompted them to organize their relations in a peaceful manner even outside the structures of the state. Indeed, humans possessed rights, and contracts were binding both before the 'pact' and in areas (such as the high seas) beyond public authority. The state was needed to deal with human ambition and to set up laws on how to divide and administer properties so as to implement the rights of sociability. But it did not destroy the natural community -the 'civil society' that was their predominant sphere of interaction. Grotius did not say too much about this community -the 'people' or the 'nation' -beyond that it did not disappear with the rise of statehood and received legal meaning as the 'common subject of sovereignty' that legitimized the governmental powers of the ruler(s) (as the 'proper subject of sovereignty'). 164 But, while those on whose behalf sovereignty was exercised played no role in government, they did exist as a community of free individuals, to be left 'in quiet possession of what is already their own'. 165 The supposition was that properties had been divided already and rules about legitimate entitlements ('what in strictness they can demand') had been set before the 'pact' was concluded. Existing social relations were, in other words, to be left as they were, and the only task was to implement these in accordance with the laws.
Even as much of the detail of Book II deals with themes that had been commonplace in scholastic property debates, the tone of Grotius' discussion and some of his conclusions are rather different from those of Vitoria or Domingo de Soto, not least when they relate to Dutch expansion. Grotius rejected the scholastic view that prohibited violent action to enforce natural law. A ruler was entitled to punish not only pirates or cannibals and those who were inhuman to their parents but also all those who 'offend against Nature' -a view that has been taken to justify 'a great deal of European action against native peoples around the world'. 167 Moreover, groups of people who needed passage over lands or rivers were to be granted such passage, including the right 'to settle in some uninhabited Land' when 'just Occasion' required this. This applied not only to persons but also to merchandise and, apparently, to military forces on their way 'to recover, by a just war, what is their own Right and Due'. 168 Finally, such travellers (in fact, colonists) may also lawfully occupy any uncultivated land in a foreign territory; in such case, they would nevertheless come under the public authority of the power that has jurisdiction over such area. 169 Gone was the Aristotelian framework that assessed the permissibility of mercantile activity by reference to the good of the community or the welfare of one's family. As Grotius explained in Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence, the sole criteria from which to judge economic transactions were the will of the parties and the equality of their relationship -this equality being measured by the standards of commutative (expletive) and not distributive (attributive) justice. 170 No extrinsic consideration was needed for a promise to be binding; all that is needed is 'the bare Will, sufficiently declared'. 171 This was not just a matter of positive law, but it also lay in 'the Nature of immutable justice'. 172 The point of interpretation was to find out the party's will: 'Nothing is more natural, than that the Will of the proprietor, desiring to transfer his Title to another, should have its intended Effect.' 173 Any voluntary exchange is presumed valid unless there has been fraud or error -that is to say, unless the free operation of the will has been prevented. 174 The famous chapters on promises and contracts dovetailed prevailing business practices, carefully distinguishing rules that were part of natural law from those belonging limitations applied only to subjects; foreigners were not under the ruler's sovereignty so that, apart from the case of criminal punishment, their rights remained inviolable. 192 In accordance with older doctrines, Grotius conceived property to be limited in a state of necessity. In a life-threatening situation such as fire or distress at sea, it was permitted to intervene with property, or, as Grotius explained, the original use right that had existed in the natural state was reinvigorated. 193 But the power of expropriation for a public good against just compensation was wider than the state of necessity and was geared to the fulfilment of the objectives of the civil pact; the civil community was entitled to demand that its members pay their share of its functioning. 194 In this way, Grotius combined a 'market' notion of civil society with a public power as a kind of local police answerable to the 'nation' -that is, the fathers of families who had set it up and determined its authority by adopting a 'constitution' to it. This did not at all mean that the powers of public authority were necessarily very limited. On the contrary, as Eric MacGilvray has written, subjective rights 'provide a new and powerful secular defense of the legitimacy of absolute rule'. 195 It was possible (and, as far as Grotius was concerned, advisable) for the pact makers to subordinate themselves to it in a very extensive way; even some sort of contract for collective enslavement was possible. 196 All trace of the ideals of virtuous citizenship that Grotius had once identified with the history of the 'Batavians' had vanished in De iure belli ac pacis. The call for virtuous government had become a set of non-enforceable exhortations directed to the king and the elites. The political freedom of the subjects was exhausted in the act of giving it up. This would open the way for the realization of another kind of freedom that had to do with their undisturbed enjoyment of private rights, not as citizens, however, but as members of civil society, owning things and trading them with each other.
Grotian 'Politics of the Rule of Law'
Jules Mazarin's librarian, Henri Duke of Rohan: 'Les Princes commandent aux peuples et l'intérêt commande aux Princes.' 199 The work suggests that the management of the interests of important social groups would also be for the interest of the prince and his state. Rohan lay out a programme for the scientific conduct of policy based on a careful management of the resources of one's state -its climate, its population, its economy and so on -principles on which Charles-Louis Montesquieu would later base his sociological brand of natural law. 200 Grotius really had very little to say about the details of good government. It was only towards the end of the century that Samuel Pufendorf began to integrate raison d'état into natural law from his position at Heidelberg and later as advisor to the Swedish and Prussian governments. 201 In the course of the 18th century, legal scholars in Germany would gradually develop a real governmental science (Policeywissenschaft and Policey-Recht) that would turn from the justification of sovereign powers to their use in the efficient ruling of the modern state machine. 202 Second, however much revolutionary thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau detested the authoritarianism of De iure belli ac pacis, the idea of human beings as sui iuris possessors of private rights could not fail to influence political modernity. For a conservative jurist such as Michel Villey, the contribution of Grotius did not lie in his originality -he had little of that -but precisely in the way he employed old themes to create an absolutist doctrine of rights that paid no attention to the circumstances in which they were to be employed. 203 It is true that the focus of those rights was on enabling economic actors -such as the Dutch East India Company -rather than private individuals and that he reserved no role in government for the 'people' in his mature work. 204 But, since then, in the hands of other people and under the influence of Locke, subjective rights of liberty and property have not only become applicable against the government but also have served to re-describe government itself as a trustee for the realization of just those rights. In Locke's famous view, 'the great and chief end … of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property'. 205 Glancing backwards at these two aspects of Grotius' work, it is not hard to see how important both have been for later developments, pushing political imagination and activism in two opposing directions. On the one hand, there has been the growth of government -bureaucratization, governmentality and the expansion of the welfare state -and the management of the economy and society for the 'good of the community', whatever that elusive expression may have been taken to mean. The period of Grotius was followed, as Pierre Rosanvallon has remarked, by a remarkable expansion of executive power across Europe, accompanied by 'une veritable sacralisation des lois … au XVIIIe siècle'. 206 In its search for 'utility', the modern science of legislation would eventually shake hands with another creation of 18th-century natural lawnamely, economics. The colonization of the life world by constantly expanding economic and technical management was to be disciplined by the parallel development of parliamentary democracies -another type of rule of law. But, as governance became 'global', the democratic imagination remained fatally hampered by the way its focus was limited to the single polity. To compensate, Western societies in the 1970s began to remember the universal and inalienable nature of subjective (human) rights, that other great Grotian theme. Could the executive governance of global regimes of knowledge and interest be perhaps controlled by formal entitlements to liberty and property of every individual across the world? In coming to terms with the backlash against the rule of law today, it is insufficient to focus only on its technocratic-managerialist or its individualist side; the two can hardly be separated from each other. During the 1990s, human rights shook hands with the global expansion of economic and expert governance. It is that bargain that is today being questioned: does the capacity to file a human rights complaint suffice to offset the afflictions of life in an underclass targeted by unending austerity?
